

ESSENTIAL OF VIṢṆUTATVA VINIRŪAYA

(Part -I)

Viṣṇutatva vinirūaya is a unique work of Śrī Madhvācārya. The work sets forth briefly all the tenets of the Dvaita school of Vedānta on the platform of reasoning. It presents a critical view of some relevant tenets and position of different schools of thought.

In *Sumadhvavijaya*, a biography of Śrī Madhvācārya, its author has compared this work with Arjuna. Arjuna, in the war of *Uttaragrahaṇa* vanquished the enemies singlehandedly. Similarly *Viṣṇutatva vinirūaya* demolishes ably and comprehensively views and arguments of different schools on various topics and establishes the supremacy of Viṣṇu.

Śrī Madhvācārya opens his work with a prayer to the God.

Sadāgamaikaviṇḍeyam samatītakṣarākṣaram
Nārāyaṇam sadā vande nirdoṣāśeṣasadguṇam

“I salute Nārāyaṇa who is free from blemishes and full of virtues; distinct from all the finite souls and from His consort Mahālakṣmi and can be known by scriptures only”.

Absolutely perfect soul is God. He is the repository of infinite virtues and absolutely free from blemishes. He is known as Nārāyaṇa, Viṣṇu, Hari and so on.

We cannot understand the Perfect Soul by means of our mind because it is filled with innumerable impressions caused by experiencing a world of material objects. God is wholly different from all kinds of sentient and insentient beings in the world. He and His spouse Mahālakṣmi, the presiding deity of Nature have never been caught in the whirl of births and deaths while the rest of sentient beings have been. The great Mahālakṣmi is subordinate to Him. We cannot perceive such a soul with such instruments of knowledge by which we perceive the corporeal world. Therefore *Vedas* and the preachings of those who have seen Him are the only means of knowing Him.



Are *Vedas* valid instruments of knowledge? People are not getting the expected results after performing the deeds (sacrifices, fasting) prescribed by *Vedas*. There are instances of sacrifices meant for begetting sons and getting rains having failed. There are sentences in *Vedas* which mean “herbs converse” and “water spoke”. These are non-sensical. Some Vedic sentences make no sense at all. Some statements in *Vedas* are contradictory. How can such a *Veda* be a valid instrument of knowing God ?

There are stories of success also. Daśaratha succeeded. Drupada succeeded. Therefore performers’ deficiencies may be responsible for not getting the expected result from Vedic deeds. Can any one claim, confidently, to have performed the Vedic deeds without any flaw? Therefore failure to get results cannot be proof enough to conclude that *Vedas* are invalid. Likewise our knowledge of words and their meanings being very meager we cannot say with any authority that some Vedic sentences are meaningless, contradictory and incongruous. Learned men have laid down various methods to understand the import of *Vedas* there will be no room for any confusion.

Author’s ignorance, illusion and deceitful attitude render a work invalid, because these are responsible for any kind of falsehood in the work. *Vedas* are not authored works. They are ageless messages. They were never conceived and put into shape of sentences by persons of letters. Thus they do not reflect any human thought or attitude. Therefore they cannot be invalid. Therefore if any vedic deed performed by human beings fails to bear the desired fruit *Veda* cannot be held responsible. As human beings are prone to commit errors knowingly or unknowingly the cause of failure must be traced to human errors. *Vedas* speak truth and truth alone and one need not hesitate to pursue Vedic studies.



Apouruṣeyatva of *Vedas*

A sentence is a composition of words that makes sense. How can there be a composition of words without a person attempting at it? Authorlessness i.e. *apouruṣeyatva* of *Vedas* is, therefore, impossible.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya has examined this question thoroughly. Some thinkers believe in the existence of transcendental realities like heaven, hell, sin and *punya* (divine acts prescribed by scriptures which bear fruits in the present or future births.) They cannot prove the existence of these verities with the help of proofs other than *apouruṣeya* sentences according to the *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya*.

Materialists say : Transcendental realities do not exist at all. Our sense organs can perceive all principles and things which the world is made of and there is no need to posit a proof in the form of *apouruṣeya* sentences.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya says : The worth of a school of philosophy lies in its principles and concepts that contribute to a better understanding of universe and to the betterment of human life. Materialism, in this sense, does not qualify to be a school of philosophy as it has nothing to throw light on because everything in the universe is in the reach of our sense organs.

Materialists say : People, over centuries, have been deluded by percepts on the existence of transcendental realities. They have been consequently, caught in the web of superstitions. They, having undertaken fasts and other observances, denied themselves worldly pleasures. The school aims at ridding people of their superstition about transcendental realities by proving their non-existence so that they would be enabled to enjoy worldly life without let or hindrance.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya says : The view of non-existence of transcendental realities has the potential of making the life miserable instead of making it happy and peaceful one.

Sense of *Dharma* and God has preserved a kind of order in society. This cannot be denied by the materialists even. Morality and virtues are the nourishing elements of social life. If virtues such as truth, honesty, love, help and sacrifice were not there as foundation of society, life would be merry on attempt of violence and deceitfulness. *Dharma* and devotion to God is the motivating power of morality and virtues. Because men committed to *dharma* sowed the attitude of *dharma* and devotion in the minds of people moral traditions have woven into our ways of life. Even the atheists have, without their knowledge, come under the influence of ethical

attitudes impregnated by *dharma*. There are instances of people claiming to be theists indulging in unethical activities. True. But theistic compulsions have put them on hold. The ethical attitude brought upon by the sense of *dharma* has played a great role in preserving a social order. The attempts of atheism to remove the roots of social order would be, undoubtedly, suicidal. It is thus the removal of the roots of the ethical attitude would result in the collapse of the social order. People would develop a feeling that why should they, being tied to the fetters of scruples, be deprived of benefits that are likely to accrue in the absence of those fetters and this feeling would pave the way for a licentious living. Stronger sections of society would suppress the weaker ones without hesitation.

In a society which has no sense of sin, conscience that can control wrong doings would have no place. The resultant anarchy would make the life miserable. Where is the place for ideals like truth, kindness, sacrifice and so on in a mere materialistic view of life? Can we see any scope for motivation to sacrifice one's own happiness and wealth and one's self too, in this view of life? The root element of all ethics is the trust in the immortality of soul and fairplay of God. Any attempt to shake this trust would be catastrophic. Destruction of social order would be the only achievement of atheism. Therefore it is necessary to accept transcendental realities such as *dharma* and *adharma*.

Here arises a question : Acceptance of *dharma adharma* may be helpful in building up a social order. But usefulness cannot make a thing real or existent. Does the ocean water become potable simply because such a change would be useful to people? Reality of a thing is proved only by proofs and not by utility. Therefore how can the utility of social order lead to the acceptance of transcendental verities?

Answer : We are aware of the limitations of our sense organs in producing cognitions. What is grasped by one sense organ is not grasped by another. The tongue grasps the taste while the eye does not. Similarly there can be things not grasped by any sense organ. Man has been able to discover many things, with the help of modern scientific instruments, which could not be grasped by his sense organs. Therefore it is not prudent to deny the existence of transcendental verities.

Some saints, over centuries, have been claiming that they have seen, with the

help of inner vision, such verities. Their demonstrations had been irrefutable. MÛ 13
 !-ÑT S »İ' ÀèYã«Û «Û Ñlâ m.? Ôÿ 13 ÉŠv Û đhÛ2 À úT'
 ÁÄãã — ã 7 — Û T Œ — ã 5D 6ã«Ç6D 6ã«Ç6D
 - ÒJwßÒđ é27ßÒhat proof proves
 the reality of transcendental realities.

The proposed proof is the unauthored *Vedas*. Do the works of great men not suffice to enlighten us on transcendental realities ? Some may say, that we are surrounded by dishonest, ignorant and deceitful persons and this arouses distrust on authors also. But authors of great works are omniscient. Omniscience does not brook any association with passion and hatred. Therefore they cannot be deceitful, we can trust their works fully. The idea of an authorless work passes comprehension. Is not a work of a great person as a proof of transcendental verities preferable to an authorless work ?

The idea of an all knowing author is not plausible. We have been seeing, everywhere, persons of limited knowledge. Therefore an omniscient person is to be posited. Even such a person can be passionate and deceitful. That he is free from such vices is to be posited. Such a person need not be an author. His authorship has to be posited

Thus the positing of an omniscient author demands a series of positings. The idea of an authorless *Vedas* requires only one positing i.e. authorlessness of a work. If the idea of an authorless work is not plausible the idea of an omniscient person free from vices is equally implausible. And it is much more difficult to identify such a person. Followers of different schools claim strongly that the founder of their school is omniscient. Therefore the work of the proposed omniscient person cannot be determined. Thus the imperativeness of a proof to dispel the doubt with regard to the reality of transcendental verities leads to the positing or discovery of unauthored *Vedas*.

How do we know that *Vedas* are unauthored? The authorship of all the works, except *Vedas*, which deal with transcendental verities are not disputed. They are well known. But nobody knows the author of *Vedas*. Can people forget the author of *Vedas* while they have preserved them, over thousands of years with great

devotion and dedication ? It is impossible to believe that people, who have preserved Vedic words, accents and order without giving room to any distortion, have forgotten their author. But nowhere in *Vedas* or in other works their author is mentioned. No tradition speaks of the author of *Vedas*. Besides, the ageless tradition of vedic studies in all of its branches has undesputedly held the view that *Vedas* are *apouruṣeya*. Nobody has claimed the authorship of *Vedas* during their ageless tradition. Therefore there would be no difficulty in accepting the authorlessness of *Vedas*.

Distinct from nonvedic works.

All schools of Vedānta accept the authorlessness of *Vedas*. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, though it accepts their validity, does not accept their authorlessness. They say that the omniscient God is their author. While all the sentences we use are authored how can *Veda* alone be authorless? What distinguishes it from other works? They ask. We know the authors of other works while we donot know the ones of *Veda*. This answer is countered with a question as to why a large number of folk songs and proverbs, the authors of which are unknown, should not be given the status of *Vedas* ?

Madhvācārya has examined these observations of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and has shown the distinctness of *Vedas* from other works.

Study and recitation of *Vedas* have come down to us in an unbroken tradition. Every student of *Vedas* has a feeling that he is studying an ancient book. Every teacher has the feeling that he is teaching an ancient book. The chain of tradition is endless. No originator can be found at any point of time. Persons who taught and learnt *Vedas* could be traced while the author of the *Vedas* could not be. Folk songs and proverbs do not have this kind of unbroken tradition. The origin of this tradition can be traced. The tradition of vedic studies goes back to endless milleniums. Thus *Vedas* are distinct from other works that are subject to temporal limits.

Here arises a doubt : Vedic Mantras are known to have seers. Seers are those who did not study *Vedas* but who had a flash of them. The origin of the tradition of vedic studies can be traced to these seers. The view of the anterior endlessness of the tradition of vedic studies is, therefore, not tenable.

The above doubt is due to lack of understanding of the way the seers got the flashes of vedic *Mantras*. Seers are not the ones who get the flashes of vedic *Mantras* hitherto unknown, for the first time. They are the ones who get the flashes of *Mantras* which have come down in the tradition of vedic studies, but not studied by them in their current birth. This previlage is bestowed on them by the God. As the *Mantras* which flashed into the minds of the sages are the very ones which have come down in the tradition of vedic studies there is no difficulty in recognising them as vedic *Mantras*. Certain distinctive traits are essential to become a seer. They are 1) At least twenty of the thirty two physical features of a pre-eminently superior person. 2) Deep knowledge of almost all the *Vedas*. 3) Assiduous practice of asceticism. Only such sentences which are divined by persons endowed with the above said traits are *Vedas*. The sages themselves have laid down the traits of the seers of *Vedas*. They help in detecting the pseudo-seers. *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* has stated these traits. Thus there is no room for any confusion with regard to the real *Vedas*. Therefore the view of the anterior endlessness of the tradition of vedic studies is not untenable. As *Vedas* are distinct from non-vedas there can be no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the former are authorless.



The Naiyāyika school of Indian philosophy is of the view that *Vedas* are authored by the God. The school says : If they are authorless their validity cannot be ascertained. Correspondence with other proofs and the character of leading to the fruitful efforts are the two useful factors in ascertaining the validity of sentences. We treat sentences valid when we actually see things denoted by those sentences. This is correspondence with other proofs. When a medicine prescribed by doctor produces the desired result we confide in the doctor's words. This is the character of leading to the fruitful efforts. But it is not possible to ascertain the validity of *Vedas* with the help of these two factors. Though one can realise or see what is stated in *Vedas* after a long practice we cannot see them now. We dont now, have the experience of salvation or heaven which are stated as goals of any spiritual pursuit.

The only other factor useful in ascertaining the validity of sentences is

omniscience and trustworthiness of their author. God alone is such a Soul. His authorship alone can bring validity to *Vedas*. Therefore they cannot be authorless.

Viṣṇutatva Vinirṇaya says : *Yukti* (reason) is not necessary for the ascertainment of validity. When we cognise a thing or sentences the cognition is generally valid. When we experience a cognition we generally take it as valid and treat the object of knowledge as real. When we cognise a thing we generally don't entertain any doubt about the reality of the thing. We see daily many objects like trees, houses and clothes. We don't go in search of *yukti* to ascertain their reality. If we have to ascertain the validity of any cognition with the help of a *yukti* only we have to resort to another *yukti* to ascertain the validity of the first one. A resort to a third *yukti* will be necessary to ascertain the validity of the second one. There will be no end to this. This is the fallacy of infinite regress. But nobody has the experience of resorting to a series of *yukti* to ascertain validity.

When the *sākṣin* cognises a cognition generated with the help of sense organs or reasoning or sentences, it cognises its validity also save in the cases of subsequent sublation. In the case of rope-serpent illusion the *sākṣin* does not grasp it as valid. The natural power of *sākṣin* stands inanimated in the wake of contradictory proof which show that the thing in front of the eye is not serpent. In the absence of such contradictory proofs nobody entertains any doubt about the validity of cognitions and reality of their objects. Therefore there is no need for any *yukti* to ascertain the validity of cognition or its instruments and therefore *Vedas* need not be compositions of a trustworthy person for the sake of validity. As the errors of author are the causes of invalidity the ascertainment of the validity of the authorless *Vedas* is easier.

Further queries on the subject are dealt with elaborately in this work.



Letters are the basic constituents of sentences. If they are not eternal *Vedas* cannot be eternal i.e. *apauruṣeya*. *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya* has gone into the question of eternality of letters very elaborately and has established the eternality of letters on the proof of experience known as *pratyabhijñā*.



A critique of Kāryatāvāda

Despite their validity, *Vedas* cannot propound God as their chief import according to the Prābhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Words make sense to only those persons who know the relationship of *vācya* (primary meaning) and *vācaka* (that which expresses the primary meaning). Words cannot denote things that are not produced by our efforts. In other words they denote only *kāryas*. *Kārya* is what can be achieved or realised by one's effort and is the object of one's desire to do so. In a sentence verbs in potential mood denote this *kārya* and other words denote things related to the *kārya*.

This is explained in the following way : A asks B to bring a book. B brings it. C, a young boy hears the instruction and observes the response of A and B. Hearing and observing this kind of instructions and responses many times C learns that instructions and responses centre around *kārya* i.e. words denote either *kārya* or things related to *kārya*. (In the present instance bringing is *kārya* and the book is related to *kārya* i.e. bringing.) God is neither a *kārya* nor related to a *kārya* if all the vedic words sing the glory of Him only. Therefore *vedas* cannot propound Brahman as their chief import. The school further says : *Vedas* intend to prescribe our duties. They do not intend to give us an account of things that exist in the universe. In accordance with their intentions they teach us a variety of *kāryas* like performance of sacrifices, study of scriptures and fasting. They speak of various *siddha* things (things that are not *kārya*) as they serve as auxiliaries. God is neither a *kārya* nor is related to one when the entire *Veda* sings His glory alone as its chief import. Therefore how can *Vedas* propound God as their chief import? Ask the Prābhākaras.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya says : Words need not necessarily denote a *kārya*. They denote both *kāryas* and *siddhas* according to exigencies. The instance of a young boy learning the relationship between words and objects cannot be used to formulate universal rule. He need not wait to reach a stage of growth when he can watch the actions like bringing the cow or opening the door to grasp words and their meanings. At a much earlier stage of his growth when people say to him 'this is your mother', 'this is your father', 'this is your brother' showing the persons and things the child grasps the words and learns their meanings. There is no mention of any *kārya* here.

Psychologically, this process alone is correct. In the *Prābhākara* process there is some time gap between the pronunciation of words by A and response by B. The child is not able to bear the words of A in mind till it watches the response by B to relate the words to the objects. Nor is the child able to recollect them after watching B's response. Acquainting the child with words and their meaning showing *siddha* objects like mother and father is easier. The universal adoption of the visual education system at the primary level vouches for this view. All the later dealings with words and their meanings are based on this first acquaintance of them. Therefore the *kāryatāvāda* of the *Prābhākara* school does not accord with our experience.



According to *kāryatāvāda* two kinds of powers are required to convey meaning of a sentence. They are : 1) Denoting power of the verb in potential mood. 2) Denoting power of the rest of the words. Verb in potential mood denotes *kārya* and rest of the words denotes things related to *kārya*.

According to *Madhvācārya* only one kind of power is enough to convey meanings of all the words in a sentence. Every word in a sentence has power to convey its meaning related with some other suitable thing which is the meaning of some other word in the sentence. This is a uniform formula applicable to all words including verbs in potential mood. Uniform formula or doctrine is always better than a two-faceted or many faceted one.



Vedas do not propound Advaita

According to the Advaita school of Vedānta *Vedas* propound the reality of Brahman alone and the unreality of the rest of the world. When the world is unreal how can *Vedas* propound the supremacy of Viṣṇu?

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya has examined this stand of the Advaita school in detail.



In the entire body of *Vedas* there is not even a single sentence that speaks of

reality of Brahman alone or in other words *abheda* of *Jīva* and *Brahman*. Some sentences like ‘*tat tvamasi*’ appear to speak of *abheda*. True. But there are hundreds of sentences which speak of *bheda* between them explicitly or implicitly. In the wake of these sentences how do we resolve that *advaita* is the chief import of *Vedas*?

The Advaita school says : hundreds of vedic sentences which speak of *bheda* between *Jīva* and *Brahman* have no power to oppose or set aside *abheda*. It is thus: When *Jīva* learns about *Īśvara* (Brahman) from scriptures or inference he learns that He is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. He (*Jīva*) knows that he is not so. This knowledge is essentially the knowledge of difference between the two. Thus difference (*bheda*) between *Īśvara* and *Jīva* is known by perception and inference. Therefore *Vedas* teaching *bheda* do not teach anything new or unknown. They just reiterate what is made known already by other instruments of knowledge. *Abheda* is not known by any other instrument other than *Veda*. *Vedas* teach them for the first time. A reiterating sentence is weaker than the one that states or propounds something a new. Weaker sentences cannot nullify stronger ones. Therefore *abheda* is the import of *Vedas*. *Bheda* is just mentioned to be set aside.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya says : Difference (*bheda*) is a relative entity. It can be cognised only in relation to its relata. One relata is the locus of *bheda* and the other is its counterpart. In case of difference between *Jīva* and *Īśvara* both *Jīva* and *Īśvara* could be either locus or counterpart of *bheda* from different standpoints. Therefore their knowledge is essential for the cognition of *bheda* between the two. *Jīva* is known by intuitive perception. But *Īśvara* is to be known by scriptures only. An independant inference cannot prove *Īśvara* for a counter inference can be easily advanced. As *Īśvara*, one of the relata, is not known by perception or inference *bheda* between *Īśvara* and *Jīva* is not known. Therefore texts do not just reiterate *bheda* but teach it as much a new as the *abheda* texts *abheda*.

II

If *bheda* is known by perception and inference *abheda* texts become invalid as they are contradicted by the former - says *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya*

The Advaita school may say : *Veda* as it is unauthored, is infalliable.

Perception and inference are prone to be defective. Therefore the former is stronger than the latter. Therefore, *Veda*, though contradicted by perception and inference, cannot be invalid.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya says : This line of thinking is favourable to *bheda*. If *Veda* is stronger than perception and inference on account of its infalliability the *bheda* texts also must be stronger. If *Veda* just reiterates *bheda* made known by perception and inference without meaning it faces the contingency of becoming weaker than perception and inference. Therefore we must say that the *Vedas* propound *bheda* on their own. Consequently *bheda* which was hitherto known by weaker perception and inference gets strength to stand on its own firmly. Now *abheda* texts stand opposed by equally strong *bheda* texts.

III

We infer fire on seeing smoke. We see the same fire when we visit the spot a little while after. We infer God. Learned mens' preachings also enlighten us about God. In both of these instances perception and preachings give us knowledge of things known earlier. But we don't consider them reiteraters and hence weaker instruments of knowledge. The later perception of fire or the preachings about God are not dependent upon the prior inference. They have functioned independently. As they fortify our inferential knowledge they are not futile either. Similarly if *Vedic* sentences instruct us about *bheda* between *Jīva* and *Īśvara* known already by inference or perception, they do not become reiteraters. They teach *bheda* independently. They fortify the knowledge of *bheda* earned by other proofs when such knowledge is beclouded by doubts caused by fallacious logic. *Vedic* sentences never become weaker even when they reiterate what was made known by other proofs.

IV

To teach *bheda* between or *abheda* of *Jīva* and *Īśvara* the knowledge of the two is a pre-requisite. The knowledge of *Jīva* must come from intuitive perception and that of *Īśvara* from *Veda*. Therefore in case of teaching *bheda* between or *abheda* of *Jīva* and *Īśvara* the two instruments form the base offering the subject

for *Veda*. Basic instrument is called *Upajīvyā*. The instrument that depends on *upjīvyā* is called *Upajīvaka*. *Upajīvyā* is stronger than *upajīvaka*. Otherwise when the two kinds of instruments are in opposition *upajīvyā* will have to be held invalid and consequently *upajīvaka* cannot take its subject from *upajīvyā*. In the absence of subject *upajīvaka* cannot teach anything and hence will have to become invalid. *Abheda* texts, according to the Advaita school draw their subjects i.e. *Jīva* and *Īśvara* from perception and inference. Therefore they are *upajīvyas*. As *upajīvakas* cannot go against *upajīvyas*, the *abheda* texts cannot teach *abheda* of *Jīva* and Brahman.

Here arises a question : *Abheda* texts are not opposed to perception and inference. If perception which is instrumental in perceiving *Jīva* makes his *bheda* from *Īśvara* also known or the inference which helps inferring *Īśvara* makes His *bheda* from *Jīva* also known *abheda* texts could be opposed to perception and inference. But it is not so. They just make *Jīva* and *Īśvara* known. Therefore *abheda* texts, though *upajīvaka*, do not face any contingency of becoming invalid.

Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya answers : True. *Bheda* is not object of said perception and inference. But when one infers *Īśvara* he learns of Him as omniscient and omnipotent. When the same person knows *Jīva* by intuitive perception he experiences limitations in his knowing ability and other potencies. On realising opposite attributes in the two, perception of difference (*bheda*) between the two is inevitable. Therefore, the *upajīvyā* instruments (perception and inference), as they make *bheda* between *Jīva* and *Īśvara* known, oppose the *upajīvaka* i.e. *abheda* text. As *upajīvyā* is stronger than *upajīvaka* *abheda* texts cannot nullify the former. Therefore *Veda* cannot teach or uphold *abheda* of *Jīva* and *Īśvara*.

V

Intuition is the strongest of all proofs. No cognition that springs out of our perception, inference and verbal testimony can nullify intuition. Intuition alone can grasp our cognitions and their validity. Nothing that is an object of intuitive perception can be unreal. Intuition is the only instrument that can examine the other instruments of knowledge and confirm their validity. We don't doubt anything that is picked up by intuition. Pleasure, pain etc. are intuitive experiences. They

are not objects of any other instruments of knowledge. Do we ever doubt our pleasure and pain? Were our own experience wrong we would have doubted all other cognitions, entities and events and consequently our life would have been a mess. We intuitively know that we are not omniscient and omnipotent. Everyone intuitively knows that he is not creator. God is creator. He is omniscient and omnipotent. Therefore *bheda* between oneself and God is always intuited. How can *Vedas* speak of *abheda* of *Jīva* and *Īśwara* against this intuitive experience ?



Brahmatarka is a very ancient treatise on epistemology and logic. *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya* quotes extensively from this work on the number and nature of proofs of knowledge and on their fallacies. In the light of the nature of proofs stated in the *Brahmatarka* the *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya* undertakes a further review of the Advaita position of *abheda* of *Jīva* and Brahman and shows the total untenability of this view.

The Work then produces various scriptural texts which explicitly state that the supremacy of Viṣṇu is the chief import of the entire *Veda*.



Bheda (difference) is a very important doctrine for the supremacy of Viṣṇu and the plurality of the world. Buddhist and Advaita thinkers have vigorously assailed 'bheda'. *Viṣṇutatva vinirṇaya* examines their arguments in detail, shows their untenability and puts forth unassailable arguments in favour of *Bheda*.

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